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Espionage in Polish criminal law: what Article 130 of the Criminal Code says

Article 130 of the Polish Criminal Code is the basic provision on espionage. Since 1 October 2023 it has had nine paragraphs and far heavier penalties than before. We explain exactly what is punishable, what the 2023 amendment changed, where it came from and what objections were raised against it.1,2,3

One article, many offences

The Criminal Code of 6 June 1997 is now in force in the consolidated text published in Journal of Laws (Dz.U.) 2026, item 1342. Espionage is covered by Article 130. The provision does not define the word “spy”. It describes conduct connected with the activity of a foreign intelligence service: taking part in it, acting on its behalf, passing information to it, collecting such information, and several other acts.1,4

The 2023 amending act does not define a foreign intelligence service. Writing in Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego (Internal Security Review), published by the Internal Security Agency (ABW), P. Burczaniuk cites the view that taking part in the activity of a foreign intelligence service means any form of active cooperation with it, including organisational membership.1,3

The wording until 30 September 2023

Before the amendment, Article 130 had four paragraphs. Taking part in the activity of a foreign intelligence service against Poland carried one to ten years’ imprisonment. Giving a foreign intelligence service information whose disclosure could harm Poland carried at least three years.2,3

Anyone who, in order to pass on such information, gathered or stored it, gained access to an IT system, or declared readiness to act on behalf of a foreign intelligence service, faced six months to eight years. Organising or directing the activity of a foreign intelligence service carried at least five years or 25 years’ imprisonment.2,3

Burczaniuk considers the old wording unclear and imprecise, which led to diverging interpretations among legal scholars and inconsistent classification of offences by prosecutors.3

Where the amendment came from

Changes were first announced in spring 2022. In a statement of 29 March 2022 the Ministry of Justice wrote that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the resulting threat to Poland’s security required further changes, prepared together with the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, the National Prosecutor’s Office and the heads of the special services. The announcement included heavier penalties and new offences, among them unintentional espionage.5

The provisions were in fact passed on the basis of a different bill. According to Burczaniuk, it was a bill tabled by members of parliament on 17 April 2023 by a group of deputies from the Law and Justice (PiS) caucus (Sejm print no. 3232). Its explanatory memorandum named as its main aim the adaptation of the Criminal Code to the changing geopolitical situation.3

In an amendment of 26 May 2023 (print no. 3232-A) the sponsors dropped one of the proposed provisions, because it raised interpretive doubts and could have penalised conduct merely similar to that described. Instead they made preparation for sabotage and subversion on behalf of a foreign intelligence service punishable, citing the need to prosecute such offences at the earliest possible stage.6

The act was passed on 17 August 2023 (Dz.U. 2023, item 1834). The changes to Articles 130 and 131 entered into force on 1 October 2023. The unintentional espionage announced by the ministry does not appear in the text as passed.1,5

What is punishable today

Paragraph 1 covers taking part in the activity of a foreign intelligence service, or acting on its behalf, against Poland. Penalty: at least five years’ imprisonment. “Acting on its behalf” is itself new; the old paragraph 1 did not include it.1,2

Paragraph 2 is the offence most often associated with espionage: giving a foreign intelligence service information whose disclosure could harm Poland. Penalty: at least eight years or life imprisonment. Paragraph 3 – declaring readiness to act on behalf of a foreign intelligence service, or gathering and storing information or gaining access to an IT system in order to pass it on – carries six months to eight years.1,2

Organising or directing the activity of a foreign intelligence service (paragraph 4) carries at least ten years or life imprisonment. A public official, or a person serving in the territorial military service on standby duty, who commits the offence in paragraph 1 faces at least eight years or life imprisonment (paragraph 5).1,2

Paragraph 6 concerns taking part in the activity of a foreign intelligence service that is not directed against Poland but is conducted on its territory without the consent of the competent authority. Penalty: six months to eight years. The provision thus also protects Poland against other countries’ services pursuing their own business on its soil.1,2

Subversion, sabotage, disinformation

Paragraph 7 provides at least ten years or life imprisonment for anyone who, while taking part in the activity of a foreign intelligence service or acting on its behalf, commits subversion, sabotage or an offence of a terrorist nature. Mere preparation for such an act (paragraph 8) carries six months to eight years.1,2

Paragraph 9 concerns disinformation on behalf of a foreign intelligence service: spreading false or misleading information in order to cause serious disruption to the political system or economy of Poland, an allied state or an international organisation of which Poland is a member, or to induce a public authority to take or refrain from a particular action. Penalty: at least eight years.1,2

The condition is a link to a foreign intelligence service. The provision does not punish every falsehood on the internet; the concepts are discussed further in our article on disinformation and FIMI.1

“Information”, not only secrets

Article 130 speaks of information whose disclosure could harm Poland, not of classified information. Disclosing classified information is a separate offence (see disclosure of classified information). Liability for espionage depends on the recipient and the possible harm, not on a classification marking; the consequences for work with open sources are discussed in our article on OSINT.1,7

A conviction for offences under Article 130(1)–(5) and (7)–(9) entails mandatory deprivation of public rights (Article 40(3) of the Criminal Code).4

Effective repentance

Article 131, adjusted in 2023 to the new wording of Article 130, provides for exemption from punishment. A person who attempted an offence under Article 130(1), (2), (5), (7) or (9) is not punished if they voluntarily abandoned the act and disclosed all the material circumstances of the offence to a law enforcement authority.1,6

For the offences in paragraphs 3, 6 and 8 a further condition is that the person made substantial efforts to prevent the intended offence. This is an incentive for people who have let themselves be recruited, often for one-off tasks over the internet (see disposable agents), to come forward to the services before they cause harm.1

What the courts say

There is little case law on espionage. In a 2021 commentary on a judgment, S. Hoc noted that no Supreme Court rulings on espionage had been published. Published judgments come mainly from regional, appellate and military courts; the same picture emerges from the list of rulings in Burczaniuk’s article.3,8

One example is the judgment of the Warsaw Court of Appeal of 24 November 2017 (II AKa 269/17), delivered under the old Article 130(1). The court held that the hostile nature of the activity of Russian military intelligence towards Poland is a matter of common knowledge that requires no proof, and that the defendant acted in full awareness that he was carrying out tasks against Poland. The court increased the sentence from four to seven years.9

According to the commentary, the first-instance court held that formal membership of a foreign service is not necessary – what counts is the actual bond between the agent and the officer (see case officer).8

The dispute over the provisions

The amendment drew objections. In an opinion for the Senate of July 2023, the Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman), Marcin Wiącek, found that the new provisions use vague and evaluative concepts, which raises doubts in the light of the principle of specificity in criminal law. He also considered that the legislature had not shown the need to make the new offences felonies punishable by eight years to life imprisonment.10

The Ombudsman also criticised the new Article 112a, which extends Polish criminal law to certain offences committed abroad using IT systems, without the requirement of double criminality and without any justification in the bill.1,10

In 2022 the Ministry of Justice announced that the changes would also cover the Act on the ABW and the AW and extend the powers of the ABW from terrorism to espionage offences. How the services handling such cases are overseen is described in our article Who oversees Poland’s special services.5

Sources

  1. Sejm of the Republic of Poland, Act of 17 August 2023 amending the Penal Code and certain other acts, Journal of Laws 2023, item 1834 (new wording of Article 130) (in Polish)
  2. Standardy Prawa (reprint of the statute), Criminal Code, Art. 130 – current wording and wording in force until 30 September 2023 (in Polish)
  3. P. Burczaniuk, Przestępstwo szpiegostwa po nowemu, czyli w świetle nowelizacji Kodeksu karnego z 17 sierpnia 2023 roku (The crime of espionage in new terms, in the light of the amendment to the Criminal Code of 17 August 2023), Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego no. 30 (2024), pp. 49–78, DOI 10.4467/20801335PBW.24.002.19604 (ABW publication)
  4. Sejm of the Republic of Poland, Notice of the Marshal of the Sejm of 2 October 2026 on the consolidated text of the Criminal Code, Dz.U. 2026, item 1342 (Art. 40(3)) (in Polish)
  5. Ministry of Justice of Poland (gov.pl), Zmiany w Kodeksie karnym związane z zagrożeniem bezpieczeństwa państwa (Changes to the Criminal Code related to threats to state security), 29 March 2022
  6. Sejm of the Republic of Poland (copy on the Senate website), Amendment to the members’ bill amending the Criminal Code and certain other acts (Sejm print no. 3232-A), 26 May 2023 (in Polish)
  7. Standardy Prawa, Penal Code, Article 265 (reprint of the statutory text) (in Polish)
  8. Stanisław Hoc (University of Opole), Glosa do wyroku Sądu Apelacyjnego w Warszawie z 24.11.2017 r., II AKa 269/17 (Commentary on the judgment of the Warsaw Court of Appeal of 24 November 2017), Prawo w Działaniu – Sprawy Karne no. 45 (2021), pp. 149–156, DOI 10.32041/pwd.4510
  9. Warsaw Court of Appeal (text in the Standardy Prawa database), Judgment of 24 November 2017, ref. II AKa 269/17 (in Polish)
  10. Commissioner for Human Rights of Poland (Ombudsman, BIP RPO), Nowe przepisy ws. przestępstwa szpiegostwa. Opinia RPO dla Senatu (New provisions on the crime of espionage: the Ombudsman’s opinion for the Senate), 25 July 2023

Checked: 15 November 2026

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