Disinformation, influence operations, FIMI: what the terms mean and how institutions define them

Falsehood, error and intent

In its action plan of 5 December 2018 the European Commission describes disinformation as verifiably false or misleading information that is created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public. The definition excludes inadvertent errors, satire and parody, and clearly identified partisan news and commentary.¹

NATO's definition is shorter: false or inaccurate information spread deliberately to manipulate the opinions and actions of others. Propaganda, according to the same page, is information designed to steer a specific target audience towards a particular behaviour or belief.³

Intent is the key. In an article on the Gov.pl portal of 21 April 2022, NASK stresses that disinformation is a wholly deliberate and intentional activity. Falsehood repeated in good faith is called misinformation; the Ministry of National Education refers readers to a code of good practice that explains disinformation, misinformation and malinformation.^4,5

FIMI: from content to behaviour

For several years the European External Action Service (EEAS) has used a broader concept, FIMI – foreign information manipulation and interference. In the glossary of its January 2024 report, FIMI is a mostly non-illegal pattern of behaviour that threatens or has the potential to negatively impact values, procedures and political processes.²

According to the EEAS, such activity is manipulative in character, conducted in an intentional and coordinated manner, by state or non-state actors, including their proxies inside and outside their own territory. The definition contains no test of whether content is true or false – it describes a way of acting.²

That is why EEAS reports focus on tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) – the patterns of behaviour threat actors use to manipulate the information environment – and use standardised analytical frameworks such as DISARM. The second report is based on 750 incidents from 1 December 2022 to 30 November 2023.²

The third report (March 2025) covers 505 incidents from 4 November 2023 to 4 November 2024, names Russia and China as the two main threat actors and divides channels into four groups: official state channels, state-controlled outlets, state-linked channels and state-aligned channels.⁶

Information and psychological operations in the military

In its approach to information threats, endorsed by defence ministers in October 2024, NATO describes them as intentional, harmful, manipulative and coordinated activities by state and non-state actors. They can include information manipulation and interference by foreign actors, information operations and disinformation. The Alliance's response has four functions: understand, prevent, contain and mitigate, and recover.⁷

NATO forces' own activity is described in doctrine AJP-3.10.1 (Edition B of 2014, since withdrawn). Psychological operations are planned activities in which messages are directed at approved audiences to influence their perceptions, attitudes and behaviour. Information operations are a staff function that integrates information activities.⁸

The same doctrine lays down the principle that psychological operations must be based on true information, and distinguishes white products (acknowledged by the sponsor), grey (not revealing their source) and black (appearing to come from a source other than the true one) – hence the notion of black propaganda.⁸

In its 2020 proposals for terms, Poland's National Security Bureau (BBN) frames information operations more broadly, as information warfare, together with the related concept of strategic communication.⁹

A lesson from history: “active measures” and the AIDS campaign

In a report of August 1987 on Soviet influence activities, the US Department of State explained that “active measures” (aktivnyye meropriyatiya) were covert or deceptive operations in support of Soviet foreign policy, and that deception was their essence. The report listed disinformation, forged documents and front organisations, and treated propaganda as distinct, though closely integrated.¹⁰

According to the report, implementation was the task of, among others, Service A of the KGB First Chief Directorate. The report describes the Indian newspaper Patriot as a paper set up by the KGB in 1962 as a vehicle for disinformation.¹⁰

The best-documented example is the AIDS campaign. According to an article by Thomas Boghardt in the CIA journal Studies in Intelligence (2009), on 17 July 1983 Patriot published an anonymous letter claiming that the disease had been caused by US experiments. The letter went unnoticed; the theme returned on 30 October 1985 in Literaturnaya Gazeta, which cited Patriot as its source.¹¹

Boghardt describes the involvement of East German intelligence (HVA Department X; see MfS) and the claim by biophysicist Jakob Segal that the virus had been created at Fort Detrick. By late 1987 the story had circulated in the media of 80 countries, in over 200 periodicals in 25 languages. In 1992 the head of the SVR, Yevgeny Primakov, confirmed the KGB's involvement.¹¹

How the European Union responds

After the European Council of March 2015, the East StratCom Task Force was set up within the EEAS to address Russia's ongoing disinformation campaigns. By spring 2021 its public EUvsDisinfo database held more than 11,000 cases of pro-Kremlin disinformation.¹²

The 2018 action plan rested on four pillars: better detection and analysis, a joint response, mobilising the private sector, and societal resilience. It announced a Rapid Alert System and an increase in the strategic communication budget from EUR 1.9 million in 2018 to EUR 5 million in 2019. Citing the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell, it identified disinformation by the Russian Federation as the greatest threat to the EU.¹

In its 2024 report the EEAS describes the tools against FIMI in four dimensions: situational awareness, resilience building, disruption and regulation, and EU external action.²

The law: the Digital Services Act and the code of conduct

The first code of practice on disinformation was signed voluntarily by the platforms; it was published on 26 September 2018.^1,13

The Digital Services Act (DSA, Regulation 2022/2065 of 19 October 2022) imposes specific obligations on very large online platforms and search engines – those with at least 45 million average monthly active recipients in the EU. They must assess systemic risks, including actual or foreseeable negative effects on civic discourse, electoral processes and public security.^14,15,16

Article 45 of the DSA provides for voluntary codes of conduct as a way of mitigating such risks. On 13 February 2025 the Commission and the European Board for Digital Services endorsed the integration of the strengthened 2022 code into the DSA framework as a code of conduct; compliance with its commitments is to be part of the annual independent audit of the platforms that signed it (including Google, Meta, Microsoft and TikTok).^13,17

Poland: criminal law and education

Since 1 October 2023, Article 130 § 9 of the Polish Penal Code has provided for a penalty of at least eight years' imprisonment for anyone who, acting on behalf of a foreign intelligence service, conducts disinformation in order to cause serious disruption to the political system or economy of Poland, an allied state or an international organisation of which Poland is a member, or to induce a public authority to act or refrain from acting in a particular way. The provision therefore concerns disinformation linked to espionage, not every falsehood online (see agent of influence).¹⁸

The second route is education. NASK published a code of good practice against disinformation, prepared by eleven organisations and institutions; it recommends, among other things, comparing sources and checking images. The wider framework is set by the concept of state information security, and the combination of disinformation with other means by the concept of hybrid threats.^4,9,19