SPYOPS.PL

SpyOps.pl › Maps › The cycle of an influence operation (FIMI)

Concept map

The cycle of an influence operation (FIMI)

Six steps in a foreign information manipulation operation: from the perpetrators’ aim to the defenders’ response. The EEAS describes such an operation as a chain of activity – from planning and preparing to executing and assessing – and draws on frameworks such as DISARM, an open standard maintained by the DISARM Foundation. This is a summary of the article in the InfoOps and PsyOps section, which has the definitions and differing views.1,2,3,4

  1. Aim

    According to the EEAS, FIMI is a mostly non-illegal pattern of behaviour, conducted intentionally and in a coordinated way by state or non-state actors. In its 2024 report the EEAS lists aims such as undermining the credibility of democratic institutions and encouraging division and polarisation within European societies. The aim is where planning begins.

  2. Narrative and content

    The perpetrators prepare their message. In the first EEAS report (100 incidents from autumn 2022) the most frequent techniques were developing image-based and video-based content; the second report notes that narratives discrediting mainstream media are common. The content need not be false – the definition of FIMI describes behaviour, not the truth of the message (see disinformation).

  3. Channels

    The message has to be published somewhere; DISARM has a separate tactic for this – selecting channels. According to the first EEAS report, formal diplomatic channels were used most often. The third report (2025) divides channels into four groups: official state channels, state-controlled media, state-linked channels and state-aligned channels.

  4. Amplification

    The perpetrators seed, share and amplify content across many channels at once to create the appearance of authentic discussion or to hide where it comes from; according to the EEAS, cross-platform coordination is the default. They use inauthentic accounts and impersonate well-known media outlets to lend their message credibility.

  5. Detection

    EEAS analysts look for patterns of behaviour – tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) – and complement them with contextual indicators such as narratives or types of targets. The EEAS links the rise in cases in its second report (750 incidents from December 2022 to November 2023) partly to more targeted detection and focused OSINT investigations.

  6. Response

    The chain model assumes that denying the perpetrator a single step can stop the whole operation. The EEAS selects countermeasures for before, during and after an incident, and the EU toolbox has four dimensions: situational awareness, resilience building, disruption and regulation (including the Digital Services Act), and EU external action, sanctions among them. The full discussion is in the article ‘Disinformation, influence operations, FIMI’.

↺ The perpetrators assess the effects and plan their next moves – in the chain described by the EEAS this is the last stage, assessment.