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Operation Mongoose (Cuba, 1961–1962)

Mongoose was a secret US government programme of 1961–1962 meant to bring about the overthrow of Fidel Castro by Cubans themselves. It was run by General Edward Lansdale and overseen by a special group of the National Security Council. After the Cuban missile crisis it was judged to be at a dead end.1,2,3

The President’s decision

According to the State Department’s documentary series Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), on 3 November 1961 President John F. Kennedy authorised at the White House a new programme to undermine the Castro government, codenamed Operation Mongoose. No other record of the meeting apart from notes has been found.1

Robert Kennedy noted that the idea was to stir up trouble on the island through espionage, sabotage and general disorder, run by Cubans. He admitted that he did not know whether they would succeed in overthrowing Castro, but wrote: ‘we have nothing to lose in my estimate’.1

On 30 November 1961 the President told members of his administration and the CIA director to use the available assets ‘to help Cuba overthrow the communist regime’. The programme was to be run by General Edward Lansdale as Chief of Operations.2

Who ran and oversaw it

The Special Group (Augmented) was set up to oversee Mongoose: the regular Special Group – the National Security Council body for covert action – augmented by, among others, McGeorge Bundy, CIA Director John McCone and General Lyman Lemnitzer. Robert Kennedy and General Maxwell Taylor, as chairman, joined it. According to FRUS, Robert Kennedy was the group’s driving force.1,4

Lansdale coordinated the CIA’s activities with the State and Defense Departments. Within the CIA the operation was run by Task Force W under William Harvey, with about 400 people at headquarters and at the Miami Station.1

Lansdale believed that Castro had considerable popular support and wanted the regime to be overthrown by the Cubans themselves rather than by a US-engineered effort from outside. The Church Committee described his ideas in its 1975 report; they became the basis of an operation known to very few.1

The plan: a revolution in October

On 18 January 1962 Lansdale assigned 32 tasks to departments and agencies. The basic plan of 20 February 1962 called for the step-by-step development of an internal revolution; October 1962 was judged the earliest feasible date for ‘a popular revolution’.5

On 1 March 1962 the Special Group limited the first phase to intelligence collection (March to May), with a review at the end of May. The CIA wanted to extend this phase until July and warned that deferring a decision on the revolution would add at least six months to the timetable.5

The question of killing Castro

At the Special Group (Augmented) meeting of 10 August 1962 – according to a memorandum by Harvey dated 14 August – Defense Secretary Robert McNamara raised the question of assassinating Cuban leaders. Harvey wrote that it was agreed the subject should not be put on record. McCone recalled in 1967 that he had objected to a suggestion to liquidate top people in the regime, including Castro.6

On 13 August Lansdale circulated a memorandum that included the phrase ‘including liquidation of leaders’. Harvey demanded that the wording be deleted from all copies.6

The Church Committee found that United States Government personnel plotted to kill Castro from 1960 to 1965. These plots, it wrote, must be understood against the background of fully authorised, comprehensive assaults on his regime, such as the Bay of Pigs (1961) and Mongoose (1962). The committee was unable to find that the assassination plots had been authorised by the Presidents.4

The end of the programme

After the Special Group meeting of 4 October 1962, CIA Director McCone noted that the ‘activist policy’ behind the operation had gone.7

On 4 January 1963, after the Cuban missile crisis, McGeorge Bundy told the President there was ‘well nigh universal agreement that Mongoose is at a dead end’. He proposed disbanding the Mongoose office and placing covert operations under a Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the State Department.3

Sources

  1. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, FRUS 1961–1963, vol. X, doc. 270, Editorial Note (Operation Mongoose, November 1961)
  2. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, FRUS 1961–1963, vol. X, doc. 278, Memorandum From President Kennedy, 30 November 1961
  3. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, FRUS 1961–1963, vol. XI, doc. 261, Memorandum From McGeorge Bundy to President Kennedy, 4 January 1963
  4. US Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), S. Rept. 94-465, 20 November 1975, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report
  5. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, FRUS 1961–1963, vol. X, doc. 309, Program Review (E. Lansdale), 2 March 1962
  6. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, FRUS 1961–1963, vol. X, doc. 371, Editorial Note (Special Group (Augmented) meeting, 10 August 1962)
  7. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, FRUS 1961–1963, vol. XI, doc. 9, Memorandum of Discussion With the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 5 October 1962

Checked: 7 November 2026

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