Viktor Suvorov: “Icebreaker”

The work and its thesis

Krzysztof Jasiewicz cites the 1992 Polish edition of “Icebreaker” (“Lodołamacz”, Warsaw). Suvorov’s thesis holds that the Soviet system was built for a war of aggression and that Stalin was preparing a surprise attack on Germany for the summer of 1941; Hitler pre-empted him on 22 June 1941. According to Suvorov, on 21 June 1941 the Politburo set 6 July as the date for a strike on the Reich and on the Romanian oilfields.^1,3

Suvorov explains the Red Army’s defeat in June 1941 by the fact that its troops were deployed for attack, not defence. PAP describes his books as having many followers but being criticised for shortcomings in historical method.^3,4

What historians accept

Jasiewicz (2018) finds some of the premises convincing: the orientation of training and armament towards offensive operations, Stalin’s 1925 doctrine of entering a war last, and the February 1941 decision to build 190 airfields along the western border, which in his view makes sense only with an offensive plan. He sees the May 1941 deployment plan as confirming part of Suvorov’s analysis.³

Eugeniusz Duraczyński (1998) described how a few historians in Russia, having read newly available documents, accepted parts of the argument. V. Nevezhin, whom he discusses, does not claim that a plan of attack has been proved, but believes the sources do not allow such a possibility to be ruled out.²

What historians reject

Gabriel Gorodetsky (1989) criticised Suvorov for producing no new archival documents, for selective quotations from memoirs taken out of context, and for confusing a counter-offensive doctrine with a pre-emptive strike; he judged the Soviet deployment to have been defensive and badly executed.¹

Jasiewicz considers an attack on 6 July 1941 unrealistic given the state of preparations at the time. He attributes the surprise above all to Stalin’s distrust of his own intelligence service and to the purges of the high command, and the decision of 23 June 1941 to build airfields on territory already occupied to chaos rather than to a plan. He also faults Suvorov for the lack of precise references.³

Duraczyński notes that some Russian historians rejected Suvorov’s books entirely.²

Intelligence behind the dispute

Jasiewicz writes that Suvorov probably had access to important documents but often did not give their archival references. He points to Soviet intelligence reports of 20 June 1941 on the concentration of German troops on the border – warnings which, in his view, were ignored.³